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MARSHAL GROUCHY'S OWN AC- 
COUNT OF THE BATTLE OF 
WATERLOO 




CiROrC'llilY 



MARSHAL GROUCHY'S OWN 

ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE 

OF WATERLOO 



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Printed for private distribution only from 
originals in the collections of W. K. Bixby 



7 

WILLIAM K. BIXBY 

ST. LOUIS, MO. 

MCMXV 



Two hundred copies of this edition were printed, of which this 
is number 



• 5 






THE TORCH PRESS 

CEDAR RAPIDS 

IOWA 



CONCERNING THE RESPONSIBIL- 
ITY FOR THE LOSS OF THE 
BATTLE OF WATERLOO 

The following is an explanatory excerpt 
from a letter to Mr. Bixby from the dealer 
through whom Marschal Grouchy's MS. ac- 
count of the Battle of Waterloo was obtained: 

"When I purchased the manuscript now in 
your possession I was assured that it was an 
article written by Grouchy, sent to a magazine 
editor, but for some reason never published. 
My research of yesterday leads me to believe 
that, instead of being an unpublished article, it 
is the original manuscript of the very account 
on which centers the entire literature concern- 
ing who lost the Battle of Waterloo. . . 
The manuscript would thus prove to be far 
more valuable than I had at first supposed, as 
the central document in an historical contro- 
versy extending over half a century concern- 
ing the greatest historical event of that cen- 
tury." [ 5 ] 



ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF 
WATERLOO 

By Marshal Grouchy 

a corner of the curtain covering the 
causes for the loss of the battle of water- 
loo lifted — the impossibility on account 
of its position for the army corps under 
the orders of marshal grouchy to take 
part in this battle 

The four days' campaign which ended the 
military career of Napoleon opened on the 
15th day of June, 18 15. The French army, 
1 10,000 men strong, crossed the Sambre at 
Charleroy and engaged with a body of 20,000 
Prussians which had taken position behind 
that city in order to retard the Emperor's ad- 
vance. Some troops of the enemy which oc- 
cupied Charleroy having retired toward Brux- 
elles by Quatra Bras, Marshal Ney was de- 
spatched by this route with 40,000 men. Im- 

[ 6] 







THE ABOVE INDORSEMENT APPEARS ON THE BACK OF THE GROUCHY MS. 



mediately after the passage of the Sambre, the 
Emperor having with him Marshal Grouchy 
and the rest of the army, making 70,000 men, 
moved toward Fleurus, and on the i6th of 
June attacked the main Prussian army, which 
he had hoped to surprise while encamped, but 
which he found drawn up in the plains behind 
that city. Although judged to be about 100,- 
000 strong, it was defeated after offering a 
stubborn resistance. Toward ten o'clock in 
the evening Marshal Blucher, profiting by the 
obscurity of the night, effected his retreat, pre- 
sumably in the direction of Namur and Wavre 
where, as was afterwards learned, lay the 
army of General Biilow, who was not able to 
arrive in time to take part in the battle of the 
i6th. (I say presumably, for cannons and 
prisoners were taken on both of these routes.) 
Up to half -past twelve at noon on the 17th 
of June the Emperor — who until then had 
ordered no movement of the army — was wait- 
ing a report from Marshal Ney; as soon as he 
received it, he ordered Marshal Grouchy to 
take his place at the head of the corps of in- 
fantry under Generals Vendame and Gerard, 
and of the cavalry under Generals Pajol and 

[ 7] 



Excelmans, forming a total of some thirty 
thousand men, and to follow the Prussian 
army; this in spite of the fact that he had been 
informed that it had fifteen hours' start of the 
army sent to pursue it, having effected its re- 
treat the evening before at ten o'clock, and the 
few light cavalry troops which had followed 
it had not been able to retard its movement. 

Napoleon, marching to the left with his 
guard and the other troops that had fought at 
Fleurus, went to join Marshal Ney, who on 
the 1 6th had defeated the advance guard of 
the Duke of Wellington near Quatra Bras. 
He then found himself facing the entire Eng- 
lish and Belgian army. Marshal Ney on the 
1 6th would have destroyed the advance guard 
which he had been fighting, if, at the moment 
when the engagement was at its height, he had 
not been deprived of the regiments of the 
Count d'Erlon, nearly 20,000 strong. These 
troops spent the day in lazily covering the dis- 
tance between Fleurus and Quatra Bras; they 
did not fire a single gun, and were of no use to 
the army fighting at Fleurus, where they did 
not even arrive! 

The only orders given by the Emperor to 

[ 8 ] 



Marshal Grouchy after he was sent off on the 
17th, and the day of the battle of Waterloo on 
the 1 8th, are those enclosed in a letter of the 
Marshal, Duke of Dalmatie (Major-general 
Soult), written on the field of the battle of 
Waterloo the i8th at one o'clock in the after- 
noon and delivered at four o'clock to Marshal 
Grouchy, then fighting with the Prussians, 
whose rear guard he had captured at eleven 
o'clock in the morning, one league from 
Wavre. After having been overthrown it was 
rallied in that city by the army of Marshal 
Blucher, who, since the evening before had 
taken its position on the heights behind the 
Dyle. Toward one o'clock Marshal Grouchy 
ordered General Vendame to take by main 
force the bridge over the Dyle. This attack 
not succeeding, he directed General Gerard 
and the cavalry of General f ajol to take the 
mill of Bielge and the village of Limellette, 
in order to effect there the passage of the river, 
while General Vendame kept up the combat 
in Wavre, and while a false attack was being 
carried on at the expense of that city. 

Such was the state of affairs on the arrival 
of the officers bringing the dispatch from the 

[ 9 ] 



Duke of Dalmatie, the tenor of which is here 
given : 

The 1 8th, one o'clock, P. M. 
To Marshal Grouchy: 

Monsieur le Marechale, you wrote this 
morning at six o'clock to the Emperor that you 
would march upon Sarra Valain; then your 
project was to go to Corbaix and to Wavre. 
This movement is in accordance with his Maj- 
esty's orders, which were communicated to 
you. The Emperor, however, commanded me 
to tell you that you must keep maneuvring in 
our direction. It is your duty to see how we 
stand, in order to act accordingly and to join 
forces with us, so that you may always be 
ready to engage and crush whatever troops of 
the enemy may attempt to disturb our right 
wing. 

At this moment the battle on the Waterloo 
side is already won; the enemy's center is at 
Mont St. Jean; so do your best to join our 
right. (Signed) LE Duc DE DALMATIE. 

P. S. A letter which has just been inter- 
cepted brings the news that General Biilow 
is to attack our right flank. We think we see 

[ lo] 



his regiment on the heights of St. Lambert; so 
do not therefore lose an instant in coming and 
joining us and in crushing Biilow, whom you 
will take in flagrante delictu. 
(Signed) LE MARSHAL Due DE DALMATIE. 

As the Prussians were masters of the most 
practicable communication between Wavre 
and Waterloo, and as there was no direct route 
between Waterloo and the position near Wavre, 
where the troops under Marshal Grouchy's 
orders were fighting, they were obliged, in 
order to join the Emperor, to travel over near- 
ly five leagues and to cross a difficult wooded 
country, cut by ravines. 

The orders to join forces were sent at one 
o'clock, P. M., and did not arrive until four 
o'clock. Marshal Grouchy's troops, which 
had to force the passage of the river, were then 
fighting with an enemy superior in numbers 
and occupying a strong position, which it was 
necessary to capture. It was then physically 
impossible for them to arrive at Waterloo in 
time to change the fortune of the day, which 
was decided — as all those instructed in mil- 
itary affairs well knew — at the moment when 

[ " ] 



General Biilow's troops appeared on the flank 
of the French army: in other words, at the 
moment when Napoleon summoned Marshal 
Grouchy to him. 

In examining with some attention the letter 
of Marshal Due de Dalmatie, one is con- 
vinced, — 

I St. That Marshal Grouchy operated ac- 
cording to the Emperor's intentions in march- 
ing upon Wavre. 

2nd. That Napoleon did not think of sum- 
moning this Marshal until one o'clock in the 
afternoon, at the very instant when the head of 
General Biilow's column showed itself on the 
Heights of St. Lambert, and consequently 
when it was much too late to paralyze the flank 
attack of the Prussians. 

Finally, it is well to remember what Eng- 
lish pride and Prussian boasting have taken 
great care to minimize — I mean the numer- 
ical superiority of the allies. It was so great 
that in spite of Marshal Blucher's losses at 
Fleurus, his army, united since the 17th with 
Billow's troops at Wavre, was triple the force 
under Marshal Grouchy's command sent to 
pursue him. The pursuit could not give great 

[ 12 ] 



results, because"!! was not ordered until fifteen 
hours after Blucher's retreat. He had the time 
to rally his army, to place it advantageously, 
and he did not expose himself or make a great 
display of genius in directing half of his army 
on Napoleon's flank, while with the other half 
he would retard for some time the march of 
Marshal Grouchy; would dispute with him 
the passage of the Dyle and (on account of the 
forces which he left before him and of their 
position) would have even chances of crush- 
ing his contingent. 

Only a blind and even culpable partiality 
(for such it is when an attempt is made to ob- 
scure the historic truth and to betray the sound 
opinion, which evidence of facts, experience of 
war, and military methods have necessarily in- 
culcated) could possibly claim, as did the ju- 
dicious author of the "Considerations sur I'Art 
de la Guerre," that Marshal Grouchy's troops 
remained on the i8th in stupid immobility and 
that on hearing the cannon on his left he ought 
to have disregarded the instructions which had 
been given him, to have abandoned the pursuit 
of Marshal Blucher, and to have gone to join 
Napoleon. 

[ 13 ] 



The writers of articles inserted in the differ- 
ent papers are equally mistaken when they de- 
clare that Marshal Grouchy was deluded by 
Marshal Blucher; that he took the troops left 
before him for the main Prussian army and 
that if he had followed a parallel march, con- 
trary to his orders, which were to pursue Mar- 
shal Blucher and to complete his defeat by at- 
tacking him wherever he happened to fall in 
with him, it would have saved Napoleon. 

Without doubt this assertion would have 
been justified, if on the evening of the 17th 
Napoleon had sent to Marshal Grouchy orders 
to join forces with him. Or even if on the 
1 8th at daybreak these orders had come, then 
they might have been carried out, at a profit- 
able time, and probably the fate of the battle 
and the issue of the campaign would have been 
different; but in truth, given as they were, on 
the 1 8th at one o'clock in the afternoon to 
troops who could not receive them until many 
hours after, who had the passage of a river to 
effect, and nearly five hours of marching in 
order to get there, and given only when the 
head of the Prussian column was in sight, it 
became illusive; for it was obviously impos- 

[ 14] 







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sible that the cooperation of Marshal Grouchy 
could have taken place, and that he prevented 
the honors of the victory from falling into the 
hands of the French army, which did not cease 
to reap a harvest of them at the field of Water- 
loo, until the moment of the flank attack of the 
Prussians. 

N. B. The original of the orders of the 
Marshal Duke of Dalmatie and all the official 
documents relating to this campaign are in the 
hands of a public officer at Paris and will be 
published some day. Not being supported by 
substantial evidence the history of this cam- 
paign and of the causes of this disaster would 
be only a sort of declaration bearing the colors 
of the party to which its writer now belongs. 



[ 15 ] 



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